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IV 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
Nagel Center, LLC and Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. ("IYR") applied for a 2011 charitable 
property tax exemption on real property and improvements in Ada County. The Ada County Board 
of Equalization denied the application and Nagel Center, LLC appealed to the Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals. The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals held a hearing and then issued a decision holding that 
Nagel Center, LLC did not qualifY for a charitable property tax exemption. Nagel Center, LLC and 
IYR appealed to the district court. At the district court, the parties agreed to have the Idaho Board 
of Tax Appeals transcript and record be used as the record at the district court and the parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment. District Judge Melissa Moody heard oral arguments on 
these motions and on June 19,2013 she issued a decision holding that Nagel Center, LLC and IYR 
do not qualifY for a 2011 charitable property tax exemption on the property at issue. Nagel Center, 
LLC and IYR then appealed to this Court. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
In August of 2006, IYR and Idaho Youth Ranch Foundation, Inc. ("Foundation") wanted 
to purchase the real property and improvements at 5465 Irving Street in Boise ("Irving Property") 
from Nagel Beverage Company. Tr., p. 19, L. 6-16. I Nagel Beverage Company had purchased 
I "Transcript" is the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals hearing that the parties stipulated to use as the record before the 
district court in this case. It is referred to hereafter as "Tr." 
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another property and needed to sell the Irving Property to IYR quickly to meet the requirements of a 
1031 exchange. Tr.,p.19, L.11-13. KeyBank advisedIYRandFoundation of the New Market Tax 
Credit Program that would allow IYR and Foundation to benefit from a much lower interest rate 
than they could otherwise get. Tr., p. 19, L. 18-21. In order to be eligible for the program, all of 
IYR's property would have to meet the criteria for underdeveloped areas. Tr., p. 19, L. 23-25. IYR 
and Foundation did not have enough time to qualify all of its properties and assist Nagel Beverage 
Company in its 1031 exchange. Tr., p. 20, L. 4-8. 
Nagel Center, LLC was formed by Foundation as a single-member limited liability 
company in August 2006 so that a separate legal entity would own only the Irving Property. 
Respondent Ex. 1, p. 137; Tr., p. 20, L. 8-10. By doing so, only this property would have to qualify 
for the New Market Tax Credit Program. Tr., p. 20, L. 8-12. Nagel Center, LLC was the conduit to 
allow the least expensive financing option for the property. Tr., pp. 18-21. 
Foundation gave Nagel Center, LLC broad authority to conduct any and allla\\tful activity, 
including engaging in business and making a profit. Paragraph 1.3 of Nagel Center, LLC's 
Operating Agreement describes the nature of Nagel Center, LLC's business. Respondent Ex. 1, 
p.114. This provision states "[t]he Company may engage in any lawful business permitted by the 
Act or laws of any jurisdiction in which the Company may do business." Respondent Ex. 1, p. 114. 
The Chairman of IYR's Board of Directors testified before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals that 
Nagel Center, LLC's business purposes were "very open ended" and that was "intentional". Tr., p. 
65, L. 17-23. "That way, if no matter what's happening with respect to the [Nagel Center, LLC], 
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there's no, you know, restrictions on our activities just by virtue of the [Operating Agreement] 
itself." Tr., p. 65, L. 17-23. In the Application for Employer Identification Number (Form SS-4) 
that Nagel Center, LLC filed with the Internal Revenue Service, Nagel Center, LLC described the 
principal activity of its business as "Real estate" and listed its principal line of business was "Real 
Estate Ownership". Respondent Ex. 2; Tr., p. 56, L. 18-25. Foundation did not restrict the business 
activities that Nagel Center, LLC could undertake. See Tr., p. 67, L. 8-12. 
Nagel Center, LLC purchased the Irving Property soon after its formation and entered into a 
twenty-five (25) year Triple-Net Commercial Lease with IYR. Respondent Ex. 1, pp. 103-110; Tr., 
p. 23, L. 24-25 and p. 55, L. 2-8. Under the lease, Nagel Center, LLC was the "Landlord" and IYR 
was the "Tenant". Respondent Ex. 1, p. 103. The monthly lease payments were $25,000 per month, 
totaling $300,000 per year, which was approximately the mortgage payment of Nagel Center, LLC. 
Respondent Ex. 1, p. 103; Tr., p. 24, L. 3-4. If Nagel Center, LLC's mortgage payment ever 
increased, the rent payment would increase as well. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 103. The Lease also 
required that "[i]f a monthly rent payment is late, the Tenant shall be charged a late fee of $100 per 
day for each rent payment that is late. Late fees shall be immediately due and payable." Respondent 
Ex. 1, p. 103. 
At the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals hearing, IYR activities on the Irving Property were 
explained in detail. Tr., pp. 11-16. But, those activities were not provided by Nagel Center, LLC. 
Tr., p. 47, L. 17-p. 48, L. 25. Nagel Center, LLC did not provide counseling or adoption services. 
Tr., p. 48, L. 5-17. It did not provide foster care recruiting or training. Tr., p. 48, L. 18-21. 
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Nagel Center, LLC never provided drug and alcohol treatment. Tr., p. 48, L. 22-25. It did not 
have any employees. Tr., p. 48, L. 2-4. The only payments ever made by Nagel Center, LLC were 
to KeyBank and the only moneys ever paid to Nagel Center, LLC were the rent payments from 
IYR. Tr., p. 47, L. 7-12. Other than owning the property, collecting rent from IYR, and paying 
the loan, Nagel Center, LLC did not conduct any other business. Tr., p. 50, L. 14-18. 
The testimony in the record shows that Nagel Center, LLC was not supported by donation. 
In fact, it did not receive any donations in 2008,2009, or 2010 from any individual or organization. 
Tr., p. 50, L. 23-p. 51, L. 5. 
The issues in this case only involve the property taxes for 2011. Foundation was merged 
into the IYR on March 31,2010. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 137-138. On August 25, 2011, Nagel 
Center, LLC's loan with KeyBank was paid off and the balance was refinanced by IYR with a loan 
from D.L. Evans Bank. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 142. In August 2011, IYR paid off the mortgage held 
by Nagel Center, LLC. Tr., p. 44, L. 24-p. 45, L. 4. On that date, Nagel Center, LLC gave a 
Warranty Deed to IYR conveying 100% interest in the property to IYR. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 142. 
Nagel Center, LLC was subsequently merged into the IYR on September 2, 2011. Respondent Ex. 
1, p. 137-138. Since that time IYR has held title to the Irving Property. 
II. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC qualified for a 2011 charitable property 
tax exemption under Idaho Code § 63-602C for the real property and improvements at 
5465 Irving Street in Boise. 
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III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court of Idaho freely reviews a district court's interpretation of a statute 
and its application to the facts. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 163 P.3d 1183 (2007). In an 
appeal from a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the 
district court's standard. Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 
(2007) citing Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489, 148 P.3d 1232, 1235 
(2006). Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56( c). The moving 
party is entitled to a judgment when the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial." Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). 
This Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists 
and whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Andersen v. Profl 
Escrow Servs., Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 745-46, 118 P.3d 75, 77-78 (2005). "Cross-motions for 
summary judgment do not change the applicable standard of review." Miller v. Idaho State 
Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 864,252 P.3d 1274, 1282 (2011). 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
Nagel Center, LLC and IYR seek a charitable property tax exemption under to Idaho Code 
§ 63-602C, which provides, in pertinent part: 
The following property is exempt from taxation: property belonging to any 
fraternal, benevolent, or charitable limited liability company, corporation or society, 
the World War veteran organization buildings and memorials of this state, used 
exclusively for the purposes for which such limited liability company, corporation 
or society is organized; provided, that if any building or property belonging to any 
such limited liability company, corporation or society is leased by such owner or if 
such limited liability company, corporation or society uses such property for 
business purposes from which a revenue is derived which, in the case of a charitable 
organization, is not directly related to the charitable purpose of which such 
charitable organization exists, then the same shall be assessed and taxed as any other 
property .... 
This statute has initial requirements. "[F]irst, the property must belong to a charitable 
organization and second, that the property be used exclusively for the purpose for which the 
corporation was organized." Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette County, 138 Idaho 684, 
688, 69 P.3d 104, 108 (2003). Nagel Center, LLC is not a charitable organization and it did not use 
the property for charitable purposes. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in In re Appeal of Sunny Ridge Manor, 106 Idaho 98, 675 P.2d 
813, 815 (1984) identified eight (8) criteria for determining whether an organization is charitable. 
The Court stated: 
A number of factors must be considered: (1) the stated purposes of its undertaking, 
(2) whether its functions are charitable (in the sense just discussed), (3) whether it is 
supported by donations, (4) whether the recipients of its services are required to pay 
for the assistance they receive, (5) whether there is general public benefit, (6) 
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whether the income received produces a profit, (7) to whom the assets would go 
upon dissolution of the corporation, and (8) whether the "charity" provided is based 
on need. 
Id. at 100, 815. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held on several occasions that property "tax exemptions are 
strictly construed against the taxpayer" and "are narrowly construed, following the 'strict but 
reasonable' rule of statutory construction." Ada County Bd. of Equalization v. Highlands, Inc., 
141 Idaho 202,206, 108 P.3d 349, 353 (2005). The property owner has the burden of proving 
that the property is exempt from taxation. Idaho Code § 63-511(4). "A taxpayer must show a clear 
entitlement to an exemption, as an exemption will never be presumed." Id. 
"Tax exemptions exist as a matter of legislative grace, epitomizing the antithesis of 
traditional democratic notions of fairness, equity, and uniformity. Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 416, 849 
P.2D 83, 86 (1993). "When an ambiguity arises in construing tax exemption statutes, the court 
must choose the narrowest possible reasonable construction." Id. "A statute granting tax 
exemption cannot be extended by judicial construction so as to create an exemption not 
specifically authorized." Sunset Memorial Gardens, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 80 Idaho 
206,219,327 P.2d 766, 774 (1958). "Exemptions are never presumed." Id. "It must be in terms 
so specific and certain as to leave no room for doubt." Id. 
A. Nagel Center, LLC Must Prove That it Qualified for a Charitable Tax 
Exemption and Cannot Rely Upon Any Charity Performed by its Member. 
Nagel Center, LLC and IYR argue that the eight-part analysis from Sunny Ridge Manor 
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should be expanded to "considerjOr property tax purposes the charitable character of the member 
organization which owns a limited liability company in determining whether such company 
qualifies as a 'charitable limited liability company. '" Appellants' Brief at 21 (emphasis in original). 
They argue throughout their appellate brief that Nagel Center, LLC should be given credit for 
charitable work done by IYR. Nagel Center, LLC and IYR advocate for this enlargement because 
they claim that limited liability companies are treated as "disregarded entities" under federal tax law 
and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Acceptance of this argument would be an 
impermissible expansion of the Idaho charitable property tax exemption statute and should be 
rejected for several reasons. 
1. Nagel Center, LLC's Argument is Not Supported by Idaho Code § 63-
602C or this Court's Interpretation of this Statute. 
For nearly thirty (30) years, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that whether an 
organization qualifies for a charitable tax exemption under Idaho Code § 63-602C is determined 
by applying the Sunny Ridge Manor analysis to the owner of the property. In re Appeal of Sunny 
Ridge Manor, 106 Idaho 98, 675 P.2d 813, 815 (1984); Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette 
County, 138 Idaho 684, 69 P.3d 104 (2003). The owner of the property must also show that it used 
the property exclusively for a charitable purpose. In Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Payette 
Cnty., 138 Idaho 684, 690, 69 P.3d 104, 110 (2003) the Idaho Supreme Court denied a tax 
exemption to the Student Loan Fund of Idaho ("SLFI") because it found that it was not a 
charitable organization and it did not use the property exclusively for charitable purposes for 
which it was created. SLFI had created the Idaho Marketing Association ("IMA"), a corporation 
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exempt from federal and state income taxes. The Court treated the organizations as separate 
legal entities and in the Court's analysis SLFI did not receive any benefit for creating IMA. 
Included in the Court's holdings was that IMA's use of an office building showed that the 
property was not used exclusively for charitable purposes for which SLFI was organized and 
denied the charitable property tax exemption. 
No Idaho appellate court has ever held that the Sunny Ridge .lManor factors should be 
applied to the member or shareholders of an organization rather than the record owner of the 
property. In addition, no Idaho appellate court has ever held that for property tax purposes an 
organization will be judged by the actions of its member or shareholders and not by its own 
conduct. There is no support for Nagel Center, LLC and IYR's argument in the charitable 
property tax exemption statute. See Idaho Code § 63-602C. Nagel Center, LLC must prove that 
it is a charitable organization and that the property was used exclusively for charitable purposes 
for which it was organized. The Sunny Ridge Manor analysis must be applied to Nagel Center, 
LLC. 
2. Nagel Center, LLC Was the Record Owner of the Irving Property. 
Nagel Center, LLC and IYR' argument must fail because the first requirement of Idaho 
Code § 63-602C is that the property belong to a charitable organization and the Irving Property was 
owned by Nagel Center, LLC. The Idaho legislature has enacted very specific requirements that 
counties and courts must follow when imposing real property taxes and granting property tax 
exemptions. See Idaho Code, Title 63, Chapters 2-6. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that, "[t]hroughout the statutes dealing with the 
taxation of real and personal property in Idaho runs the concept that the owner of the record title is 
the person to be considered as the taxpayer. .. " Russet Potato Co. v. Board of Equalization of 
Bingham County, 93 Idaho 501, 505, 465 P.2d 625, 629 (1970). As the Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals correctly noted, "[i]n the context of property taxation, 'belonging to' refers to the record 
owner, which is defined in Idaho Code § 63-201(19) ... ,,2 In the Matter of the Appeal of the Idaho 
Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC, 2012 WL 6913252 at 3 (Idaho Bd. Tax App. 2012). The "record 
O\vner" is defined in Idaho Code § 63-201(24) as "the person or persons in whose name or names 
the property stands upon the records of the county recorder's office." 
The county assessor "shall ascertain the current ownership of land from documents recorded 
in the county recorder's office and/or from evidence of ownership furnished to the assessor which is 
admissible at trial ... " Idaho Code § 63-307(1). County assessors are required to determine the 
owner of the property because property taxes can only be assessed against the person or entity that 
is the "record owner" of the property. The county must deliver the valuation assessment notice to 
the taxpayer or his agent or representative. Idaho Code § 63-308(1). Ada County is not free to 
ignore these requirements and it must impose property taxes against the record owner of the real 
property. 
2 Idaho Code § 63-201 has been amended and Idaho Code § 63-201 (19) is now the defmition of"[p ]ersonal property." 
The defInition of "[record] owner" is now at Idaho Code § 63-201(24). 
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Nagel Center, LLC was the record owner of the Irving Property on January 1, 2011.3 Rich Aff; 
Tr., p. 33, I. 22-p. 34, l. 4. Christopher D. Rich, the Ada County Recorder, stated that "[o]n 
January 1, 2011 the Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC was the entity in whose name the 
property at 5465 Irving Street, Boise, Idaho, Ada County Parcel No. R7777817790, stood upon 
the records of the Ada County Recorder's Office." Rich Aff 
Since Nagel Center, LLC was record owner of the Irving Property, only it was legally 
responsible for the 2011 real property taxes. IYR had no statutory obligation to pay those taxes 
because Idaho Code § 30-6-304(1) clearly states: 
The debts, obligations or other liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in 
contract, tort or otherwise: (a) Are solely the debts, obligations or other liabilities of the 
company; and (b) Do not become the debts, obligations or other liabilities of a member or 
manager solely by reason of the member acting as a member or manager acting as a 
manager. 
If Nagel Center, LLC had not paid its property tax, Ada County could not have collected 
those property taxes from IYR. Ada County would have no recourse against IYR if Nagel Center, 
LLC failed to pay the taxes on the property. 
As Nagel Center, LLC is the record owner obligated to pay the property tax, only it can be 
granted a charitable tax exemption under Idaho Code § 63-602C. Nagel Center, LLC must prove 
that it is a charitable organization and that it used the property exclusively for charitable purposes. 
3 Nancy Proctor, IYR's Vice President, Treasurer, and Chief Financial Officer testified before the Idaho Board of Tax 
Appeals that Nagel Center, LLC owned the property on January I, 2011. Transcript, p. 33, I. 22-p. 34, I. 4. She also 
testified that Nagel Beverage Company sold the Irving Property was to Nagel Center, LLC. Transcript, p. 35, L. 17-21. 
The loan agreement for the purchase of the Irving Property was between Nagel Center, LLC and KeyBank. Respondent 
Ex. 1, pp. 51-102; Transcript, p. 36, L. 18-19.3 The Warranty Deed issued by Nagel Center, LLC to IYR on August 25, 
20 II clearly states that Nagel Center "is the owner in fee simple" of the Irving Property. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 120. 
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3. Under Idaho Law, a Limited Liability Company is an Entity Distinct From 
Its Members. 
Nagel Center, LLC, a separate and distinct legal entity, owned the Irving Property on 
January 1, 2011.4 Under Idaho law, a limited liability company must generally be treated as an 
entity that is separate and distinct from its members. Idaho Code § 30-6-1 04( 1) specifically states 
that "[a] limited liability company is an entity distinct from its members." In addition, Nagel 
Center, LLC and IYR treated each other as separate legal entities with respect to the Irving 
Property. They signed the Triple-Net Commercial Lease for the Irving Property as distinct legal 
entities. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 103. Nagel Center, LLC also demonstrated that it was a distinct 
legal entity capable of entering into and fulfilling contractual obligations when it executed the 
Loan Agreement to purchase the Irving Property. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 51. 
Since a limited liability company is a separate and distinct legal entity, Nagel Center, LLC 
must prove that it qualified for a charitable property tax exemption based upon its own operations, 
not the actions of its member. IYR's use of the property as a tenant is not controlling. 
4 The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals previously held in In the Matter of the Appeal of Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, 
LLC, that 
Nagel Center is a separate recognized legal entity under Idaho law. Nagel Center's status as a disregarded 
entity for income tax purposes has no bearing on its status concerning property taxes. Just as there are benefits 
of a particular form of business entity, so are there burdens. One must bear the burdens associated with the 
particular form of entity chose; even those unintended. Regardless of underlying motivations, Foundation 
chose to create Nagel Center as a limited liability company. It cannot now chose to ignore this fact to suit the 
particular situation at hand. 
2008 WL 2736143 at 5 (Idaho Bd. Tax App. 2008); Respondent Ex. 1, p. 170. 
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4. IYR and Foundation Reaped the Benefits of Nagel Center, LLC as a 
Separate Legal Entity. 
Nagel Center, LLC was originally created so that IYR and Foundation could qualify for the 
New Market Tax Credit Program and receive a lower interest rate on its loan to purchase the Irving 
Property. Tr., p. 19, L. 18-21. IYR and Foundation wanted Nagel Center, LLC, as a separate legal 
entity, to own only the Irving Property so that only that property would have to qualify for this 
program. Nagel Center, LLC also shielded IYR and Foundation from any obligation to pay the 
property taxes on the Irving Property and from any potential liability stemming from ownership 
of the property. After reaping the benefits of having Nagel Center, LLC be a separate legal entity, 
IYR now wants this Court to disregard that Nagel Center, LLC was a separate legal entity. This 
behavior should be discouraged. 
5. Nagel Center, LLC and IYR' Reliance on Federal Tax Law and 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles is Misplaced. 
Nagel Center, LLC and IYR argue that federal tax law and Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles treat Nagel Center, LLC as a "disregarded entity" and, therefore, this Court should treat it 
as a "disregarded entity" for this state property tax exemption. Appellants' Brief at 20. Nagel 
Center, LLC and IYR failed to cite any Idaho statute, regulation, or court decision stating that a 
limited liability company should be treated as a "disregarded entity" for property tax exemptions. 
Federal tax law and accounting practices are irrelevant and Nagel Center, LLC's interpretation of 
federal tax law is incorrect in many respects. Thus, this argument should be rejected. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF PAGE 13 
Federal tax law and accounting practices are irrelevant. Nagel Center, LLC and IYR mix 
federal income tax law and accounting practices with state property tax law and fail to cite any legal 
authority for doing so. Federal income tax law and accounting practices should not be confused 
with the requirements of Idaho's charitable property tax exemption statute, Idaho Code § 63-602C. 
Neither this statute nor any of the Idaho appellate court cases involving charitable property tax 
exemptions hold that federal tax law or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles should be 
considered when deciding whether an organization qualifies for a charitable property tax 
exemption. Instead, under Idaho Code § 30-6-104(1) "[a] limited liability company is an entity 
distinct from its members." 
This argument is also incorrect in many respects. Nagel Center, LLC and IYR appear to 
argue that all limited liability companies are "disregarded entities" under federal tax law, 
including income tax law. Appellants' Brief at 20. For federal income tax purposes, a business 
entity with only one owner is either taxed as a corporation or is disregarded. 26 C.F.R. 
§ 301.7701-2. A wholly-owned subsidiary can be taxed as a separate corporation. See 26 C.F.R. 
§ 301.7701-3. In addition, all business entities, even those that are "disregarded entities" for 
federal income tax purposes, are treated as a separate entities for federal employment taxes and 
certain federal excise taxes. See 26 C.F.R. § 30 1.770 1-2(c)(2)(iv) and (v). 
Finally, this argument must fail because charitable organizations are not prohibited from 
owning for-profit subsidiaries and having unrelated business income. See 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.511 and 
1.512; Idaho Code § 63-3025B. Under federal tax law, a charitable organization may create a 
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limited liability company and have it taxed as a corporation. It also could create a for-profit limited 
liability company and pay unrelated business income tax on its operations. Federal tax law does not 
support Nagel Center, LLC's arguments. 
For these reasons, Nagel Center, LLC must show that it is a charitable organization and that 
it used the property for charitable purposes. It cannot claim it is charitable based upon the actions 
of its member. 
B. Nagel Center, LLC is Not a Charitable Organization and, Therefore, Does Not 
QualifY for a Charitable Tax Exemption. 
Nagel Center, LLC is not a charitable organization under the Sunny Ridge ]vlanor analysis 
outlined by the Idaho Supreme Court. It fails to meet all or almost all of the elements of that 
analysis. 
1. The Stated Purpose of Nagel Center, LLC's Undertaking. 
To determine the stated purposes of an organizations undertaking, the Idaho Supreme Court 
first looks at that organization's founding documents. See Cmty. Action Agency, Inc. v. Ed of 
Equalization, 138 Idaho 82, 85, 57 P.3d 793, 796 (2002). 
When Foundation created Nagel Center, LLC, it did not restrict the business activities that 
Nagel Center, LLC could undertake to only charitable purposes. See Tr., p. 67, L. 8-12. Nagel 
Center, LLC was created with broad authority to conduct any lawful business activity. Its 
Operating Agreement states in Section 1.3 that it "may engage in any lawful business permitted by 
the Act or laws of any jurisdiction in which the Company may do business." Respondent Ex. 1, p. 
114. Additionally, it reported its type of business as "Real Estate Ownership" and listed the 
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principal activity of its business as "Real estate" on its Application for Employer Identification 
Number (Form SS-4) filed with the Internal Revenue Service in August 2006. Respondent Ex. 2. 
The Chairman of IYR's Board of Directors testified before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals that 
Nagel Center, LLC's business purposes were "very open ended" and that was "intentional". Tr., p. 
65, L. 17-23. "That way, if no matter what's happening with respect to the [Nagel Center, LLC], 
there's no, you know, restrictions on our activities just by virtue of the [Operating Agreement] 
itself." Tr., p. 65, L. 17-23. These documents show that the stated' purposes of Nagel Center, LLC's 
were not charitable. 
In its brief, Nagel Center, LLC attempts to adopt the IYR's charitable purposes as its own. 
Nagel Center, LLC argued that the Articles of Incorporation of IYR permit IYR to "establish other 
organizations ... to assist in the advancement of the charitable purposes of the Idaho Youth Ranch." 
Appellant's Brief at 16. Nagel Center, LLC asserts that this means it gets the benefit of IYR's 
charitable purposes. This argument fails for several reasons. First, IYR did not create Nagel 
Center, LLC; the Foundation created it. Appellant, Ex. 2. Thus, it does not appear that Nagel 
Center, LLC was created under this provision of IYR's Articles of Incorporation. Even ifIYR had 
created Nagel Center, LLC it could not adopt the charitable purposes of IYR because they are 
separate legal entities. Furthermore, although IYR may be authorized by its Articles of 
Incorporation to create other organizations that does not mean that those entities must be non-profit, 
charitable organizations. A for-profit enterprise that generated unrelated business income for IYR 
would assist it in advancing its charitable purposes. 
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Nagel Center, LLC argued that it has a charitable purpose because the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement with Nagel Beverage Company "obligated the property to be held for charitable 
purposes." Appellants' Brief at 16. A contract with a third party cannot give an organization a 
charitable purpose. The charitable purpose must be established in the founding documents of an 
organization, such as the Operating Agreement or Articles of Incorporation. Even if a contract 
could give an organization a charitable purpose, the Purchase and Sale Agreement between Nagel 
Beverage Company and Nagel Center, LLC does not require that Nagel Center, LLC use the 
property for charitable activities. The agreement stated that "[f1or as long as Buyer owns and holds 
the Property for charitable purposes, the Property shall be operated under the name 'Idaho Youth 
Ranch Nagel Center' or similar name approved by Nagel." Respondent Ex. i, p. 42. This language 
only obligated Nagel Center, LLC to operate the property under the name "Idaho Youth Ranch 
Nagel Center" while it used the Irving Property for charitable purposes. It does not require that 
Nagel Center, LLC use the property for charitable purposes. 
Nagel Center, LLC's stated purposes are not charitable. Nagel Center, LLC cannot adopt 
IYR's purposes as its own because they are distinct legal entities. 
2. Whether Nagel Center, LLC's Functions were Charitable. 
The stated functions are next analyzed to determine whether they are charitable. Nagel 
Center, LLC's stated functions were to engage in any lawful business activity and those are not 
charitable functions. 
In addition, Nagel Center, LLC did not function as a charitable organization. Other than 
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owning the property, collecting rent from IYR, and paying the loan, Nagel Center, LLC did not 
conduct any other business. Tr., p. 50, L. 14-18. The Idaho Board of Tax Appeals correctly held 
that Nagel Center, LLC's "function appears to be as a landlord, which is not charitable." In the 
}.1atter of the Appeal of Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC, 2012 WL 6913252 at 4 (Idaho Bd. 
Tax App. 2012). 
Nagel Center, LLC purchased the Irving Property with a loan from KeyBank and entered 
into a twenty-five (25) year Triple-Net Commercial Lease with IYR. Respondent Ex. 1, pp. 103-
110; Tr., p. 23, L. 24-25 and p. 55, L. 2-8. Under the Lease, Nagel Center, LLC was the 
"Landlord" and IYR was the "Tenant". Respondent Ex. 1, p. 103. The monthly lease payments 
were $25,000 per month, totaling $300,000 per year, which was approximately the mortgage 
payment of Nagel Center, LLC. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 103; Tr., p. 24, L. 3-4. If Nagel Center, LLC's 
mortgage payment ever increased, the rent payment would increase as well. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 
103. The Lease also required that "[i]f a monthly rent payment is late, the Tenant shall be charged a 
late fee of $1 00 per day for each rent payment that is late. Late fees shall be immediately due and 
payable." Respondent Ex. 1, p. 103. 
Nagel Center, LLC and IYR argue that Nagel Center, LLC should get credit for charitable 
work done by IYR. Nagel Center, LLC and IYR allege that the charitable function of Nagel Center, 
LLC "was to support the charitable activities of the Youth Ranch by providing the Youth Ranch 
with a building space to conduct those charitable activities." Appellants' Brief at 16. If this Court 
adopted this rationale, it would have far reaching consequences as any business organization whose 
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only activity is owning a piece of property and leasing it to a charitable organization could argue 
that it is entitled to a charitable property tax exemption. This is a significant expansion of the 
charitable property tax exemption statute and should be rejected. 
Finally, there is no proof in the record that Nagel Center, LLC charged IYR below-market 
rent. In fact, Nancy Proctor, Vice President, Treasurer, and Chief Financial Officer of IYR stated 
that she believed that the rent was below-market but Nagel Center, LLC and IYR offered no proof 
that it was below market rates. Tr. P. 26, L. 3-8 and p. 49, L. 4-24. Ms. Proctor also testified that 
the market rate of rent was not a consideration when setting the rent amount in the lease between 
Nagel Center, LLC and IYR. Tr., p. 49, L. 4-24. At the time that the rent payment was established, 
there was no discussion about charging a discounted rent to IYR. Tr., p. 49, L. 20-24. The only 
purpose for setting the rent amount at $300,000 per year was to cover the cost of Nagel Center, 
LLC's mortgage. Tr., p. 49, L. 20-24. This is not a charitable function. 
Nagel Center, LLC stated functions are not charitable and it fails this element of the Sunny 
Ridge analysis. 
3. Whether Nagel Center, LLC was Supported by Donations. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously stated that it "considers outside donations to be 
an important charitable factor because it reduces the cost to the general public." Owyhee 
Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Ada Cnty., 123 Idaho 962, 965, 855 P.2d 47, 50 (1993). The Idaho 
Supreme Court in In re Appeal of Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc., 119 Idaho 126, 133, 
804 P.2d 299, 306 (1990) also examined whether the donations were used to support charitable 
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activities on the property. 
In 2006, Nagel Beverage Company sold the Irving Property to Nagel Center, LLC for less 
than the appraised value.s Tr., p. 24, L. 19- p. 25, L. 19. The record does not show that any other 
donations were ever received by Nagel Center, LLC. It is clear that Nagel Center, LLC did not 
receive any donations in 2008, 2009, or 2010 from any individual or organization. Tr., p. 50, 
L. 23-p. 51, L. 5. 
Nagel Center, LLC attempts to adopt some ofIYR's donations as its own. In 2007, IYR 
received a $350,000 grant and matching contributions from the public. Appellant Ex. 11. These 
donations were given to IYR, not Nagel Center, LLC. 
There is no evidence in the record that the donation from Nagel Beverage Company was 
either used to provide IYR with below-market rent or to provide a public benefit. The 2006 
donation by Nagel Beverage Company is not sufficient to show that Nagel Center, LLC deserved a 
property tax exemption five years later in 2011. N agel Center, LLC was not supported by 
donations and it fails this element of the Sunny Ridge analysis. 
4. Whether the Recipients of Nagel Center, LLC's Services were Required 
to Pay for the Assistance they Received. 
In holding that Nagel Center, LLC does not meet this element of the Sunny Ridge test, the 
Idaho Board of Tax Appeals stated: 
From the record it does not appear Appellant offers assistance to anyone. Its only 
5 It is important to note that Nagel Beverage Company appeared to be under duress to sell this property because Nagel 
Beverage Company had purchased another property and needed to sell the Irving Property to IYR quickly to meet the 
requirements of a 1031 exchange. Tr., p. 19, ll. 11-13. It is unclear from the record whether Nagel Beverage Company 
would have sold this property to Nagel Center, LLC at a reduced cost ifnot for this duress. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - PAGE 20 
outside relationship appear to be with IYR, which is required to pay $25,000 per 
month for its use of the subject property, and the financing bank which holds 
subject's mortgage. 
In the Matter of the Appeal of Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC, 2012 WL 6913252 at 4 
(Idaho Bd. Tax App. 2012). 
Nagel Center, LLC does not provide any assistance to any member of the general public. It 
bought the Irving Property and leased it to IYR. Under the Triple-Net Commercial Lease, IYR was 
required to pay $300,000 per year to lease the property. Therefore, it does not meet this element of 
the analysis. 
5. Whether there was a General Public Benefit. 
"For a corporation's uses to be considered charitable it is essential that they provide some 
sort of general public benefit." Housing Southwest, Inc. v. Washington County, 128 Idaho 335, 
339,913 P.2d 68,72 (l996)(citation omitted). "If the general public does not receive a direct 
benefit from a corporation's donations, then the question presented by the 'general public benefit' 
factor is whether the corporation fulfills a need which the government might otherwise be 
required to fill." Id. "While the requirement that a corporation lessen the burden of government is 
but one factor to be considered in determining tax exempt status, it is nevertheless an important 
one." Id. 
In Owyhee Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Ada Cnty., 123 Idaho 962, 966, 855 P.2d 47, 51 
(1993), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed whether it is charity to provide a benefit only the 
members of a corporation. Owyhee Motorcycle Club ("OMC") charged the general public an 
entry fee to watch the races and fees to participate in the races. OMC members did not have to 
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pay the gate fee when participating in the races, but they paid the same competition fee as the 
general pUblic. Members that desired to watch the races paid a reduced gate fee. All fees were 
used to maintain the tracks and other race facilities. OMC members also had the privilege of 
using the property for dirt-bike riding on days when there are no races and the general public did 
not have similar access. The Court stated that OMC's services benefited its members and not the 
public at large. The general public did not receive a charitable benefit and the organization did 
not meet a need the government might otherwise need to fulfill. This service to its members and 
its use of the property disqualified OMC from receiving a charitable property tax exemption. 
The only activities conducted by Nagel Center, LLC were owning the property, collecting 
rent from IYR, and paying the loan to KeyBank. Tr., p. 50, L. 14-18. It did not have any 
employees. Tr., p. 48, L. 2-4. The Board of Tax Appeals correctly held that "[t]here is no evidence 
of Appellant directly providing a general public benefit to the public." In the Matter afthe Appeal 
of Idaho Youth Ranch Nagel Center, LLC, 2012 WL 6913252 at 4 (Idaho Bd. Tax App. 2012). 
In addition, Nagel Center, LLC did not fulfill a need that the government might otherwise be 
required to fill as the government is under no obligation to rent a building to IYR.6 
6 Nagel Center, LLC also argues that the property was used after hours by police for training police dogs. This use 
appears to be de minimis. Furthermore, since the property was leased to IYR, it was IYR that provided this benefit to 
the police. Judge Moody stated that "using the property to train police dogs was not a charitable activity." Memorandum 
Decision and Order at 9. 
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Nagel Center, LLC did not provide a general public benefit and it fails this important 
element of the Sunny Ridge Mnanor analysis.7 
6. Whether the Income Received Produced a Profit. 
Nagel Center, LLC failed to prove that it did not produce a profit. Separate financial 
statements were never created for Nagel Center, LLC. Tr. 29, L. 4-8 and 17-23. It is Nagel Center, 
LLC and IYR' burden to prove they qualify for a property tax exemption and they failed to prove 
this element of the Sunny Ridge analysis. 
7. To Whom the Assets of the Organization Go Upon Dissolution. 
"Another indication of charitable status is whether an organization's assets are distributed 
to the public or to some other charitable cause upon dissolution." Owyhee Motorcycle Club, Inc. 
v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 962, 966, 855 P.2d 47,51 (1993). When the organization's governing 
documents do not show that its assets will be go charity upon dissolution, the organization will 
fail this element of the Sunny Ridge Manor test. Id.; See also In re Appeal of Sunny Ridge 
Manor, 106 Idaho 98, 103,675 P.2d 813,818 (1984). 
Nagel Center, LLC's Operating Agreement provides in Section 4.3 that upon dissolution, " . 
. . Company property shall be distributed in accordance with applicable law." Respondent Ex. 1, p. 
116. In other words, the Operating Agreement does not restrict where or to whom Nagel Center, 
LLC's assets could be transferred upon its dissolution and this is not charitable. 
7 Appellants argue that some of the services IYR provided, "especially drug and alcohol treatment programs-the 
government contracted with the Youth Ranch to provide." Appellants' Brief at 19. Since the government is paying IYR 
to provide these services, they are not public benefits provided by IYR. Instead, the government is providing these 
public benefits. See Housing Southwest, Inc. v. Washington County, 128 Idaho 335, 339, 913 P.2d 68,72 (1996). 
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8. Whether the Charity Provided is Based on Need. 
There is no evidence in the record that Nagel Center, LLC provided any charity based 
upon need. IYR and Foundation desired to purchase the Irving Property and qualify for the New 
Market Tax Credit Program. This program allowed IYR and Foundation to benefit from a much 
lower interest rate than they could otherwise have received. Tr., p. 19, L. 18-21. Foundation 
formed Nagel Center, LLC so that Nagel Center, LLC would own only this property and only this 
property would have to qualify under the New Market Tax Credit Program. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 
137; Tr., p. 20, L. 8-12. Nagel Center, LLC was the conduit to allow the least expensive 
financing option for the Irving Property. Tr., pp. 18-21. IYR then paid $300,000 per year to lease 
the Irving Property from Nagel Center, LLC. In addition, there is no proof in the record that the 
lease payment charged by Nagel Center, LLC was a below-market rate. Nancy Proctor, Vice 
President, Treasurer, and Chief Financial Officer of IYR testified that the market rate of rent was 
not a consideration when setting the rent amount in the lease between Nagel Center, LLC and IYR. 
Tr., p. 49, L. 4-24. Nagel Center, LLC did not provide any charity based upon need. 
Nagel Center, LLC fails to meet the eight-part Sunny Ridge Manor analysis. It was a real 
estate holding company that borrowed money from KeyBank, purchased the Irving Property, and 
leased it to IYR for $300,000 per year. It is not a charitable organization and, therefore, it is not 
entitled to a charitable tax exemption. 
C. Nagel Center, LLC Did Not Use the Property for Charitable Purposes and, 
Therefore, it Does Not Qualify for a Charitable Property Tax Exemption. 
Even if Nagel Center, LLC and IYR could show that Nagel Center, LLC was a charitable 
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organization, they do not qualify for a property tax exemption because Nagel Center, LLC did not 
use the property exclusively for charitable purposes. Nagel Center, LLC and IYR argue that the 
Triple-Net Commercial Lease was not a commercial lease. This lease was clearly called a 
"Commercial Lease" and Nagel Center, LLC charged IYR $300,000 per year to lease the Irving 
Property. They cannot now fairly claim that this was not a commercial lease. In addition, Nagel 
Center, LLC shielded IYR and Foundation from liability for the property taxes and from liability 
related to ownership of the property. Nagel Center, LLC did not use the Irving Property for a 
charitable purpose. 
Using property to benefit only members of an organization is not a charitable use of 
property. As discussed above, in Owyhee Motorcycle Club, Inc. v. Ada Cnty., 123 Idaho 962, 
966,855 P.2d 47,51 (1993), the Idaho Supreme Court decided whether it is charity to provide a 
benefit only the members of a corporation. In that case, Owyhee Motorcycle Club charged 
reduced fees to its members and allowed members to use the propeliy for dirt-bike riding on days 
when there were no races, but the general public did not have similar access. The Court denied 
Owyhee Motorcycle Club's charitable property tax exemption because this service to its 
members and use of the property was not charity. 
Property must be used to directly provide charity or it is not a charitable use. The Idaho 
Supreme Court in Malad Second Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 75 Idaho 162, 166, 269 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1954) considered whether an 
organization was entitled to a religious or charitable property tax exemption. In that case the 
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property was used to raise wheat, which was then shipped to a flour mill in Utah owned by the 
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, where it is processed into flour. All of that flour 
was then distributed to the various wards and stakes of the church as a part of its welfare program 
for the use and benefit of indigent, aged and needy members. Id. The Court held this was not a 
charitable use of the property. It stated that the taxpayer was "not entitled to exemption from 
taxation on property which it owns and from which it derives a revenue, even if the funds or 
produce so derived are devoted exclusively to charitable purposes." Id. at 166, 1079. 
Nagel Center, LLC and IYR rely heavily on this Court's decision in Boise Central Trades & 
Labor Council, Inc. v. Board of Ada County Commissioners, 122 Idaho 67, 831 P.2d 535 (1992) to 
argue that the Triple-Net Commercial Lease was not a commercial use of the Irving Property. This 
case involved a fraternal organization, not a charitable organization. This Court defined "fraternal" 
as "[a ]ny society organized for the accomplishment of some worthy object through the efforts of its 
members working together in brotherly union, especially if it be organized not for selfish gain, but 
for the benefit of the membership or for the benefit of the membership of men in general." Id. at 70, 
538 (citation omitted). Thus, a fraternal organization is, by definition, specifically created to serve 
its members. Boise Central Trades was an Idaho non-profit corporation whose membership 
included local unions, councils, and related organizations chartered or associated with the AFL-
CIO. It owned real property that included offices, conference rooms, and a meeting room that were 
primarily occupied by the labor organizations who paid reduced rent to Boise Central Trades. In 
addition, Boise Central Trades leased space to a life insurance company and a credit union. The 
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Idaho Supreme Court first analyzed whether Boise Central Trades was a qualifying fraternal 
organization and held that it was. The Court then considered whether Boise Central Trades used 
the property for fraternal purposes and held that Boise Central Trades' lease of offices, conference 
rooms and a meeting room at a reduced rate to its members was a qualifying use of the property and 
not a commercial lease of the property. Those leases did not prevent Boise Central Trades from 
receiving a property tax exemption on the portion of the property leased to its members. However, 
the Court held that Boise Central Trades' leases to the life insurance company and credit union 
were for commercial purposes and, therefore, should be taxed. 
Under this Court's decision in Boise Central Trades, a fraternal organization is created to 
serve its members and providing office space to its members at less than market rates is a fraternal 
use of the property. In this case, Nagel Center, LLC claims that it is a charitable organization and 
has never claimed to be a fraternal organization. This Court, in Sunny Ridge Manor and every other 
decision during the last thirty (30) years involving a charitable organization, has always held that 
for an organization to receive a property tax exemption it must use property to provide a benefit to 
the public or fulfill an obligation the government might otherwise be required to provide. Nagel 
Center, LLC's lease of the Irving Property to IYR is not a charitable use of the property. 
Under this Court's case law, Nagel Center, LLC did not use the property for a charitable 
purpose. Even if it provided IYR, its member, with a special benefit, that is insufficient to qualify 
for a charitable property tax exemption. In addition, the tenns of the Triple-Net Commercial Lease 
show that it was a commercial lease. The monthly lease payments were $25,000 per month, 
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totaling $300,000 per year. Respondent Ex. 1, p. 103; Tr., p. 24, L. 3-4. Nancy Proctor, Vice 
President, Treasurer, and Chief Financial Officer of IYR testified that the market rate of rent was 
not a consideration when setting the rent amount in the lease. Tr., p. 49, L. 4-24. At the time that 
the rent payment was established, there was no discussion about charging a discounted rent to IYR. 
Tr., p. 49, L. 20-24. 
Nagel Center, LLC did not use the Irving Property exclusively for a charitable 
purpose and, therefore, it is not entitled to a charitable property tax exemption. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Nagel Center, LLC is not entitled to a charitable property tax 
exemption under Idaho Code § 63-602C. The decisions of the District Court, the Idaho Board of 
Tax Appeals, and the Ada County Board of Equalization should be upheld. 
GREG H. BOWER 
By: 
Gene A. etty 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorn 
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